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Ethical Reflections o n Cyberstalking 
Frances S. Grodzinsky and Herman I Tavani 
This essay examines some ethical aspects of stalking behavior in cyberspace. We 
have argued elsewhere that recent online stalking incidents raise a wide range of 
ethical concerns, including issues affecting gender (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2001), 
personal privacy (Tavani and Grodzinsky, 2002), and physical vs. virtual harm 
(Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2002). The primary axis of discussion in this essay has to 
do with implications that cyberstalking has for our notion of moral responsibility, 
both at the collective (or group) and individual levels. For example, do collectivi-
ties and organizations such as Internet service providers (ISPs) have any moral obli-
gations to cyberstalking victims, which go beyond legal obligations covered in strict 
liability law? And do ordinary Internet users have a moral obligation to inform (and 
possibly also to assist) persons whom they discover to be the targets of online stalk-
ers? In our analysis of these questions, particular attention is paid to a cyber-
stalking incident involving Amy Boyer. 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n : - S t a l k i n g I n c i d e n t s i n C y b e r s p a c e 
What is cyberstalking? And how do stalking incidents in cyberspace raise ethical con-
cerns? In answering these questions, we begin with a definition of stalking in gen-
eral. According to Webster's Neiu World Dictionary of the American Language, to engage 
in stalking is "to pursue or approach game, an enemy, etc. stealthily, as from cover." 
In the context of criminal activities involving human beings, a stalking crime is gen-
erally considered to be one in which an individual ("the stalker") clandestinely tracks 
the movements of another individual or individuals ("the stalkeefs]"). Cyberstalking 
can be understood as a form of behavior in which certain types of stalking-related 
activities, which in the past have occurred in physical space, are extended to the online 
world. We should note, however, that criteria used in determining which kinds of 
behavior should count as stalking crimes in the physical realm has been neither con-
sistent nor clear. Hence, it also has been more difficult to determine what the crite-
ria should be for a determining a stalking crime in the cyber-realm. 
One difficulty in understanding some of the essential features of cyberstalking 
crimes is that they sometimes border on, and thus become confused with, broader 
forms of "harassment crimes" in cyberspace. Consider a recent incident involving 
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twenty-year old Christian Hunold, who was charged with terrorizing Timothy 
McGillicuddy, a high school principal in the state of Massachusetts. Hunold con-
structed a Web site that included "hit lists" of teachers and students at that 
Massachusetts school, on which he also included a picture of the school that was 
displayed through "the cross hairs of a rifle." Using various pseudonyms, Hunold 
corresponded with several eighth graders in the school. He then made specific 
threats to these Massachusetts students, who had no idea.that they were com-
municating with a person who lived in Missouri ("The Web's Dark Side," 2000). 
Should this particular criminal incident be viewed as a case of cyberstalking? Or is 
it better understood under a different description such as "cyber-harassment?" 
A criminal incident involving Randi Barber and Gary Dellapenta is sometimes 
also included under the category of cyberstalking. In 1996, Barber met Dellapenta, 
a security guard, through a friend. Although Dellapenta wanted a relationship with 
Barber, she spumed his advances. A few months later, Barber began to receive tele-
phone solicitations from men; and in one instance, a "solicitor" actually appeared 
at the door of her residence. Barber seemed to be unaware of how potentially dan-
gerous her situation had become. For example, she had no idea that Dellapenta 
had assumed her identity in various Internet chat rooms, when soliciting "kinky 
sex." Anonymity and pseudonymity tools, available to any Internet user, allowed 
Dellapenta to represent himself as Barber, via screen names such as a "playfulkitty4UM 
and "kinkygal30." Barber became aware of what was going on only after she asked 
one caller why he was phoning her (Foote, 1999). Note that in this alleged case of 
cyberstalking, Dellapenta engaged others to stalk his intended victim in physical 
space. So once again, we can ask whether the Barber/Dellapenta incident is a gen-
uine case of cyberstalking or whether it can be more appropriately described as an 
instance of a harassment involving the use of Internet technology. 
Thus far we have briefly described two different criminal incidents that some 
authors have referred to as examples of cyberstalking. It is perhaps worth noting 
that no physical harm resulted to victims in either incident; and in both cases, it 
was difficult to separate certain harassment activities (in general) from stalking 
behavior in particular. Also, in the Barbar/Dellapenta case, the staiking-related 
activities involved both physical space and cyberspace. We next examine a stalking 
incident involving Amy Boyer, which we believe is a clearer case of cyberstalking. 
2. T h e A m y Boyer Cybers ta lk ing C a s e 
On October 15,1999, Amy Boyer, a twenty-year-old resident of Nashua, NH, was mur-
dered by a young man who had stalked her via the Internet. Her stalker, Liam 
Youens, was able to carry out most of the stalking activities that eventually led to 
Boyer's death by using a variety of online tools available to any Internet user. 
Through the use of online search facilities, for example, Youens was able to find 
out where Boyer lived, where she worked, what kind of vehicle she drove, and so 
forth. Youens was also able to use other kinds of online tools, typically provided by 
Internet service providers (ISPs), to construct two Web sites. On one site, he posted 
personal information about Boyer, including a picture of her; and on another site, 
Youens described, in explicit detail, his plans to murder Boyer. 
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The Amy Boyer case raises several ethical and social questions, independent of 
the important fact that the stalking behavior in this incident eventually led to Boyer's 
death. For example, some have argued that Boyer's privacy was violated. We could 
ask whether Boyer was a victim of online defamation. We could also ask whether 
Youens had a right to post information about Boyer on his Web site, and whether 
such a "right" is one that ought to be protected by free speech. Or should such 
"speech" be controlled in cyberspace? Also, we could ask whether issues raised in 
the Boyer case are more ethically significant than those in other online stalking inci-
dents because of the physical harm caused to Boyer, resulting in her death. Although 
the Amy Boyer case raises several ethical issues, we can ask whether there is any-
thing unique or even special about these issues from a moral point of view. 
3. W h a t , if A n y t h i n g , Is Ethically Signif icant A b o u t 
Cybersta lking Cr imes? 
From an ethical perspective, an interesting question is whether there is anything 
unique or even special about the Amy Boyer case in particular, or cyberstalking in 
general. On the one hand, we do not claim that cyberstalking is a new kind of crime; 
nor, for that matter, do we argue that cyberstalking is a "genuine" computer crime 
fTavani, 2000). Yet can we reasonably ask whether Internet technology has made a 
relevant difference in the stalking case involving Amy Boyer? Perhaps the more impor-
tant question, however, is: Has cybertechnology made a moral difference? One 
might be inclined to answer no. For example, one could argue that "murder is mur-
der," and that whether a murderer uses a computing device that included Internet 
tools to assist in carrying out a particular murder is irrelevant from an ethical point 
of view. One could further argue that there is nothing special about cyberstalking 
incidents in general—irrespective of whether or not those incidents result in the 
death of the victims—since stalking activities have had a long history of occurrence 
in the "off-line" world. According to this line of reasoning, the use of Internet tech-
nology could be seen as simply the latest in a series of tools or techniques that have 
become available to stalkers to assist them in carrying out their criminal activities. 
However, it could also be argued that the Internet has made a relevant differ-
ence with respect to stalking-related crimes because of the ways in which stalk-
ing activities can now be carried out. For example, Internet stalkers can operate 
anonymously or pseudononyrhously while online. Also consider that a cyberstalker 
can stalk one or more individuals from the comfort of his or her home, and thus 
does not have to venture out into the physical world to stalk someone. So Internet 
technology has provided stalkers with a certain mode of stalking that was not pos-
sible in the pre-Internet era. 
It could also be argued that cyberstalking has made possible certain kinds of 
behavior that challenge our conventional moral and legal frameworks. These chal-
lenges have to do primarily with issues of scale and scope. For example, a cyberstalker 
can stalk multiple victims simultaneously through the use of multiple "windows" 
on his or her computer. The stalker can also stalk victims who happen to live in 
states and countries that are geographically distant from the stalker. So, potentially 
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both the number of stalking incidents and the range of- stalking activities can 
increase dramatically because of the Internet (Tavani, 2002). However, we leave open 
the question whether any of these matters make a moral difference. 
In the remainder of this essay, we focus on two questions involving issues of 
moral responsibility in.the Boyer case: (1) Should the two ISPs that permitted 
Youens to post information about Amy Boyer on Web sites that reside in their 
Internet "space" be held morally accountable? (2) Do ordinary users who happen 
to come across a Web site that contains a posting of a death threat directed at an 
individual (or group of individuals) have a moral responsibility to inform those indi-
viduals whose lives are threatened? 
4. Moral Responsibi l i ty a n d Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
As noted above, Youens set up two Web sites about Amy Boyer: one containing 
descriptive information about Boyer, as well as a photograph of her, and another on 
which he described in detail his plans to murder Boyer. To what extent, if any—either 
legally or morally, or both—should the ISPs that hosted the Web sites created by 
Youens be held responsible? Because this question is very complex, it would be ben-
eficial to break it down into several shorter questions. For example, we first need to 
understand what is meant by "responsibility" in both its legal and moral senses. We 
also have to consider whether we can attribute moral blame (or praise) to an organ-
ization or collectivity (i.e., a group of individuals), such as an ISP. We begin by briefly 
examining some recent laws and court challenges that either directly or indirecdy 
pertain to questions involving responsibility and liability for ISPs. 
In Stratton Oafemont v. Prodigy Services Company (1995), the court determined that 
Prodigy could be held legally liable since it had advertised that it had "editorial con-
trol" over the content in the computer bulletin board system (BBS) it hosted. In the 
eyes of the court, Prodigy's claim to have editorial control over its BBS made that 
ISP seem similar to a newspaper, in which case the standard of strict legal liability 
used for original publishers could be applied. In response to the decision in the Prodigy 
case, many ISPs have since argued that they should not be understood as "original 
publishers," but rather as "common carriers," similar in relevant respects to telephone 
companies. Their argument for this view rested in part on the notion that ISPs pro-
vide the "conduits for communication but not the content"This view of ISPs would 
be used in later court decisions (such as Zeran v. America Online Inc. 1997). 
In Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the function of ISPs 
was interpreted in such a way that would appear to protect them from lawsuits 
similar to the one filed against Prodigy. Here the court specifically stated, "No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court eventually struck down CDA, Section 230 of that 
Act has remained intact. While ISPs are not legally liable for the content of their 
Web sites or for the content of other electronic forums that they also might host— 
e.g., forums such as bulletin boards, chat rooms, and list servers—they have 
nonetheless been encouraged to monitor and filter, to the extent that they can, the 
content of these electronic forums. But this has presented ISPs with a thorny legal 
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problem. Consider, for example, that the more an ISP edits content, the more it 
becomes like a publisher (such as a newspaper). And the more it becomes like a 
publisher, with editorial control, the more liable an ISP becomes from a legal per-
spective. So, effectively, there could be some disincentive for ISPs to monitor and 
filter content. This, in turn, raises a moral dilemma for ISPs. 
Should Internet Service Providers be held morally accountable for objectionable 
behavior that occurs in their forums? Deborah Johnson (2001) notes that while it 
might be easier to make a utilitarian case for holding ISPs legally liable in certain 
instances, it would be much more difficult to make the case that ISPs should be 
morally responsible for the behavior of their customers. Recently, however, Richard 
Spinello (2001) and Anton Vedder (2001) have tried to show, via very different kinds 
of arguments, why ISPs also should be held morally accountable to some extent. 
Neither Spinello nor Vedder address the issue of cyberstalking per se; however, we 
believe that Spinello's remarks regarding "on-line/lefamation" and Vedders's com-
ments regarding on-line "harm," both of which are associated with ISPs, can help 
shed some light on the. question before us. We briefly examine both arguments. 
4.1 ISP Accountability. The Spinello View 
Arguing that ISPs should be held morally accountable in cases involving defamation, 
Spinello first distinguishes between "moral responsibility" and "moral accountabil-
ity." In making this distinction, he uses a model advanced by Helen Nissenbaum (1994). 
According to Nissenbaum's scheme, accountability, unlike responsibility, does not 
require causality or a causal connection. Spinello points out that because ISPs do not 
cause defamation, they cannot be held responsible in the strict or narrow arrow 
sense of the term. However, he argues that they could, nonetheless, be held account-
able—i.e., "answerable"—in the sense that they "provide an occasion or forum" for 
defamation. Spinello is careful to point out that simply because an ISP presents an 
"occasion for defamation," it does not necessarily follow that an ISP is accountable. 
Rather, for an ISP to be accountable, two further conditions are required: (a) the ISP 
must also have some capability to do something about the defamation, and (b) the 
ISP failed to take action once it had been informed. Spinello believes that this stan-
dard of accountability takes into consideration what ISPs can reasonably do—i.e., what 
they are capable of doing—to prevent defamation or at least to limit its damage. So 
the fact that an ISP might not have caused the defamation does not rule out the pos-
sibility that the ISP can be held accountable in some sense for defamatory remarks. 
Spinello concedes that technical and economic factors make it virtually impos-
sible for ISPs to take preventative, or what he calls "pre-screening," measures that 
would detect or filter out defamatory messages.Thus we cannot hold ISPs respon-
sible in a causal sense for defamation. Assuming that Spinello's overall argument 
is correct, however, we might hold ISPs accountable if they fail to take certain 
actions once they are informed that a victim has been defamed. For Spinello, these 
steps would include three actions: (i) prompt removal of the defamatory remarks; 
(ii) the issuance of a retraction on behalf of the victim; and (iii) the initiation 
of a good faith effort to track down the originator so that the defamation does 
not reoccur. 
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Does this threefold requirement provide us with a standard of accountability that 
is a "reasonable middle ground," as Spinello suggests? Or is it an unreasonable expec-
tation for ISPs? Spinello notes that in the current system, a victim of defamation has 
no legal recourse because of the absolute immunity given to ISPs. On the other hand, 
the strict legal liability that was applied in the Prodigy case seems unduly harsh for 
ISPs. So Spinello believes that his alternative scheme provides the appropriate mid-
dle ground needed, because it grants some protection to victims of defamation with-
out burdening the ISP. So even if the law does not require ISPs to take any action, Spinello 
believes that "post-screening" in a "diligent fashion" for content along the lines of the 
threefold criteria described above is the morally right thing to do. He concedes, how-
ever, that ISPs do not have the capability to "pre-screen" content for defamation. 
4.2 ISP: Accountability: The Vedder Argument 
Anton Vedder (2001) has recently advanced a very different kind of argument for 
why we should consider holding ISPs morally responsible for harm caused to indi-
viduals. Vedder suggests that we begin by drawing an important distinction between 
two senses of moral responsibility: prospective and retrospective responsibility. 
Whereas retrospective responsibility tends to be "backward looking," prospective 
responsibility is "forward looking." Vedder believes that in the past, arguments 
that have been used to ascribe legal liability to ISPs have tended to be prospective 
in nature. This is because the primary objective of liability laws has been to deter 
future on-line abuses rather than punish past offenses. 
Vedder also notes that even though ISPs are not legally liable for their content 
under current U.S. law, the mere threat of legal liability can be used to deter ISPs 
from becoming lax about "policing" their electronic forums to some reasonable 
extent. So underlying the reasoning for arguments for applying strict legal liabili-
ty to ISPs is the utilitarian principle that having liability laws in place will deter 
harm to ISP users in the future. And this legal argument, in turn, is based on a notion 
of moral responsibility that is essentially prospective in nature. Vedder also points 
out that we are hesitant to attribute a retrospective sense of responsibility to ISPs 
because this sense of moral responsibility: 
(A) is usually applied to individuals (as opposed to organizations or what he calls 
"collectivities"), and 
(B) it also often implies guilt. 
And as Vedder correctly notes, the notion of guilt is typically attributed to individuals 
and not to organizations or collectivities. He suggests, however, that in some cases it 
also makes sense to attribute the notion of guilt to a collectivity such as an ISP. 
Attributing some moral accountability to ISPs makes sense, in Vedder's scheme, 
because of the connection that exists between retrospective and prospective respon-
sibility. Vedder argues that it makes no sense to hold an agent (i.e., either an indi-
vidual or a collectivity) responsible for an act in a prospective sense if that agent 
could not also be held responsible for the act in a retrospective sense as well. So 
Vedder concludes that if we assume that collectivities such as ISPs can be held 
responsible in a prospective sense— a rationale that has been used as the basis for 
utilitarian arguments in attributing legal liability for ISPs—then we can also ascribe 
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retrospective responsibility to ISPs. So, as in the case of Spinello, Vedder believes 
that ISPs can be held morally accountable to some extent for speech that is com-
municated in their electronic forums. 
4.3 Some Implications for ISP Accountability in the Amy Boyer Case 
We can now apply Vedder's and Spinello's arguments to the Amy Boyer cyber-
stalking case. Should Tripod and Geocities, the two ISPs that enabled Liam Youens 
to set up his Web sites about Boyer, be held morally accountable for the harm 
caused to Boyer and to her family? And'should those two ISPs be held morally 
accountable, even if they were not responsible (in the narrow sense) for causing 
harm to Boyer and even if they can be exonerated from charges of strict legal lia-
bility? If the arguments by Vedder and Spinello succeed, then it is reasonable to 
hold these ISPs morally accountable if it also could be shown that Tripod and 
Geocities were capable of limiting the harm that resulted to Boyer. (Tim Remsberg, 
Amy Boyer's stepfather, has recently filed a wrongful death suit against both ISPs.) 
Of course, one might ask what the purpose would be in attributing moral respon-
sibility to ISPs if no legal action could be taken against them. At least two differ-
ent replies are possible to this question, both of which might also cause us to be 
more careful in our thinking about moral issues involving cyberspace. First, an analy-
sis of moral issues in this light could help us to distinguish further between moral 
and legal aspects of controversial cyberspace issues. Second, such an analysis can 
also help to consider some ways in which moral responsibility can be applied at 
the collective, as well as at the individual, level. 
5. Moral Respons ib i l i ty a n d Ordinary Internet U s e r s 
We next examine questions of moral responsibility that apply at the individual 
level, i.e., at the level of individual users in online communities. For example, do 
ordinary Internet users have a moral responsibility to inform "would-be victims" 
of their imminent danger to online stalkers? If an Internet user had been aware of 
Boyer's situation, should that user have notified Boyer that she was being stalked? 
In other words, should that user be morally obligated to do so? 
Various proposals for controlling individual behavior in online communities have 
resulted in a conflict between those who wish to regulate strictly by law and those 
who wish to preserve the practice of self-regulation. Of course, this dispute is 
sometimes also at the base of arguments involving claims having to do with a "safe" 
social space vs. a "restrictive'' one. In the case of cyberstalking, should we assist 
others based strictly on formal legal regulations, or should we assist them because 
it is the morally right thing to do? 
5.1 A Minimalist Sense of Moral Obligation vs. an "Ethic of Care" 
Some have argued that while morality can demand of an agent that he or she "do 
no harm" to others, it cannot require that an agent actively "prevent harm," or "do 
good." In one sense, to do no harm is to act in accordance with the rules of a moral 
system. But is doing so always sufficient for complying with what is required of 
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us as moral agents? In other words, if it is in our power to prevent harm and to do 
good, should we do so? Some theoretical frameworks suggest that individuals 
should prevent harm (and otherwise do good), whenever it is in their power to do 
so. For example, if one believes, as some natural law theorists assert, that the pur-
pose of morality is to alleviate human suffering and to promote human flourish-
ing, whenever possible, then clearly we would seem obligated to prevent harm in 
cyberspace. An interesting account of this view has been advanced by Louis Pojman 
(2001). Unfortunately, we are not able to present Pojman's argument here in the 
detail that.it deserves, since doing so would take us beyond the scope of this 
paper. But we can see how, based on a modeflike Pojman's, one might develop a 
fuller theory in which individuals have an obligation to "assist" others in the act 
of preventing harm from coming to those persons. 
We recognize the difficulties of defending a natural law theory; and we are not 
prepared to do so here. However, we also believe that the kind of limited or mod-
erate natural law theories that can be found in Pojman, and to some extent in James 
Moor (1998), can be very useful in making the case for an extended sense of moral 
obligation at the level of individuals. 
Another moral framework that implies an expanded sense of moral responsi-
bility on the part of individuals is the "ethic of care," introduced in a seminal work 
by Carol Gilligan (1982). Complying with a "care ethic," individuals would assist one 
another whenever it is in their power to do so. As such, an ethic based on care is 
more robust than a mere "non-interference" notion of ethics that simply involves 
"doing no harm to others"—i.e., it is concerned with a sense of commitment to oth-
ers that Virginia Held (1995) describes as "above and beyond the floor of duty." 
Gilligan's ethic of care has been contrasted with traditional ethical systems, such 
as utilitarian and Kantian theories. Alison Adam (2000) points out that traditional 
ethical theories are often based simply on following formal rules and that they tend 
to engender a sense of individualism (as opposed to community). Adam (2001,2002) 
has also argued that an ethic of care, in particular, and feminist ethical theory in 
general, can help us to understand more clearly some of the social and ethical impli-
cations of cyberstalking behavior in ways that traditional ethical theories cannot. 
Adopting an "ethic of care" in cyberspace would mean that individuals, i.e., ordi-
nary Internet users, would be prone to assist others whenever they can help to pre-
vent harm from coming to them. From this perspective, individuals would assist 
one another, even though there may be no specific laws or rules that require them 
to do so. In what sense would such an expectation on the part of individuals expand 
our conventional notion of moral obligation? 
5.2 Expanding the Sphere of Moral Responsibility: A Duty to Assist 
Questions concerning whether individuals have a "duty to assist" others often 
arise in the aftermath of highly publicized crimes such as the one involving the 
Kitty Genovese case in 1964. Genovese, a young woman, was murdered on the street 
outside her apartment building in Queens, New York, as thirty-eight of her neighbors 
watched. None of her neighbors called the police during the 35-minute period of 
repeated stabbings. Some have since referred to this refusal to assist a neighbor in 
critical need as "the Genovese Syndrome." Several police officers interviewed in the 
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aftermath of the Genovese incident believed that Genovese's neighbors who wit-
nessed the attack were morally obligated to notify the police, even though there 
may have been no formal law or specific statute requiring them to do so. 
Drawing an analogy between the Genovese and Boyer cases, we can ask whether 
users who might have been able to assist Boyer should have done so (i.e., whether 
they were morally obligated to assist her). We can also ask what kind of commu-
nity cyberspace will become, if people refuse to assist users who may be at risk to 
predators and murderers. First, we need to consider the potential harm that could 
come to members of the online community if we fail to act to prevent harm from 
coming to those individuals, when it is in our power to help and when doing so 
would neither cause us any great inconvenience nor put our safety at risk. What 
would have happened to Randi Barber if no one had intervened in her behalf? In 
the cyberstalking case involving Barber and Dellapenta, Barber's father, with the 
cooperation of the men who were soliciting her/ provided evidence that led to 
Dellapenta's arrest. In the case of Amy Boyer, however, the same sense of individual 
moral responsibility and concern was not apparent. Consider that some Internet 
users had, in fact, viewed the Youens' Web site but did not inform Boyer that she 
was being stalked and that her life was in imminent danger. Like Kitty Genovese 
who received no assistance from members of her physical community, Amy Boyer 
received no assistance from members of the online community. 
Because of what happened to Amy Boyer, and because of what could happen to 
future victims of online stalking, we argue that ordinary users, as members of an 
online community, should adopt a notion of moral responsibility that involves 
assisting fellow users. Doing so would help to keep cyberspace a safer place for every-
one, but especially for women and children who are particularly vulnerable to 
stalking activities. Failing to embrace such a notion of moral responsibility, on the 
other hand, could result in users disconnecting themselves from their responsi-
bilities toward fellow human beings. 
6. C o n c l u s i o n 
We have examined some ethical concerns involving cyberstalking in general, and 
the Amy Boyer case in particular. We saw that stalking activities in cyberspace raise 
questions about the sphere of moral responsibility, both for ISPs and ordinary 
Internet users. We argued that ISPs and individual users, each in different ways, 
should assume some moral responsibility for helping to prevent harm from coming 
to individuals targeted by cyberstalkers. 
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